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Abstract:  
 
This paper analyses the evolution of economists’ productivity 
after an important award such as the John Bates Clark Medal or the 
“Nobel Prize”. A diff-in-diffs methodology is used, with a control 
group composed of economists with characteristics close to the 
members of the treatment group, who were awarded prizes. Several 
robustness checks are used with different indicators of productivity 
(articles, weighted or not by reviews’ rankings and working papers) 
and with or without economists and time fixed effects in panel 
estimates. We find that John Bates Clark Medals alter the (yearly 
cumulated) ranking of articles, while the number of publications 
remains unchanged, but only because of an increase in publications 
in non-ranked reviews. As regards Nobel Prizes, they neither alter 
the number of articles nor their quality. 
 
Keywords: award, diff-in-diffs methodology, John Bates Clark, 
Nobel Prize, productivity 
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1. Introduction 
 
Do prizes in economics, such as the John Bates Clark or the 
Nobel Prize, affect productivity? 
 
All outcomes are possible, depending on the factors at play:  
 An increase in productivity, due to a rise in motivation or in the 
financing of projects. 
 A decrease in productivity, due to the fact that those who were 
awarded the prize think they have reached their goal and prefer to 
allocate their time in a different way, for instance, by delivering 
more speeches, investigating other areas or taking on 
responsibilities other than research. This decrease in productivity 
may be incidental, in that the economists had already reached the 
peak of their productivity and it would have declined anyway. 
However, assessing this effect is difficult and would suppose that 
the people awarding the prizes know when the peak of a career 
has been reached. This is a strong assumption given the 
information asymmetry between the prize-givers and the 
contenders. 
 No change in productivity: even if the awarding of the prize leads 
to gains in terms of reputation and financing (amount of the 
prizes, or increased financing of projects), economists do not 
change their behavior. Concerning the rise in financing, this may 
be perceived as a temporary shock as opposed to a permanent 
change, by analogy with the permanent income hypothesis. 
 
The impact of these prizes cannot be assessed directly using 
dummies alone because many factors (age, year, etc.) can have an 
influence. Even if we try to control for factors such as age, year or 
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each individual’s profile by adding an economist fixed effect, other 
factors may come into play. We thus need to consider a control group 
and a diff-in-diff methodology. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: after discussing the need 
for a control group and control variables from a methodological point 
a view, we compare the paper with the existing literature. We then 
set the results from the various econometric estimates. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Methodology : need for a control group and 
control variables such as age 
 
2.1.Construction of the control group 
 
To construct the control group, we need economists who have 
characteristics that are comparable with those of the treatment group. 
For that purpose, we include economists who were awarded prizes 
other than those being tested. Since we are testing the impact of 
different prizes (the Nobel Prize, the John Bates Clark Medal, the 
Frisch Medal and the IZA reward), and since these prizes have not 
been awarded to the same economists (not all John Bates Clark 
Medals were awarded the Nobel Prize and conversely), economists 
who have been awarded prizes different from the one considered in 
the regression can be used for the control group.  
 
Moreover, we include economists who are among the best 
358 ranked in the RePEc classification (we select only some of these 
economists, using the additional condition of age). We check that a 
sizable share of these economists is also considered favorites for the 
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prizes under consideration, such as the Nobel Prize, by entities that 
make forecasts on this topic (such as Thomson Reuters). A lot of 
these economists are also fellows of the Econometric Society, and 
the proportion is roughly comparable to the one of the treatment 
group. For example, 78% of the economists of the sample who have 
been awarded neither the Nobel Prize nor the John Bates Clark 
Medal are members of the Econometric Society, to be compared with 
88% of the economists of the sample who have received at least one 
of these two rewards. 
 
2.2.Need to control for the age of the economists 
 
Whether they were awarded a given prize (treatment group) 
or not (control group), the age of an economist seems to impact their 
productivity. This is why we control for economists’ ages in 
regressions. 
 
This stylized fact is illustrated by the following graphs. 
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Graph 1: Distribution of economists in the potential sample (treatment and control group, 
without no age condition at this stage) by age 
 
Source: RePEc, author’s calculations  
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We can see in this first graph that the there is a peak in the 
age distribution at around 55 years. Although this may be due to a 
period effect (in the sense that the number of economists trained and 
likely to be in the sample may depend on the period of birth), 
justifying the inclusion of a year effect, there also seems to be a 
variation in productivity depending on age, which suggests that we 
need to include a fixed age effect in our regressions. 
 
We use another indicator to confirm the influence of age on 
the productivity of the economists in the sample: we calculate the 
ratio between the actualized score (provided by RePEc) and the non 
actualized score of each economist. 
We then draw a graph connecting this ratio with the age of 
the economists (Cf. Graph 2). 
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Graph 2: Ratio of the actualized score/non actualized score (average=1) 
 
Source: RePEc, author’s calculations  
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This ratio decreases up to the age of around 65, and then 
stabilizes below the average (around 0.9). The average ratio is 
reached at around 55 years of age. 
 
The impact of age is confirmed by Hamermesh (2013). This 
article also confirms that productivity depending on age evolves over 
time. These findings justify including both age and year variables in 
the regressions. 
 
 
3. Comparison with the existing literature 
 
This hypothesis has already been tested in the realm of 
mathematics: Cf. Borjas & Doran (2013). However, the present 
article differs from this in a number of ways: 
 Unlike mathematics, a “Nobel Prize” (or equivalent) has been 
attributed in economics since 1969. We are thus able to analyze 
the impact of this prize and that of other prizes such as the John 
Bates Clark, the Frisch Medal and the IZA award. 
 Among the variables of productivity, we consider not only the 
number of publications, but also their quality. As a robustness 
check, we use an indicator which is the sum of the following 
annual publication rankings for each economist
2
:  
                                                          
2
 As this indicator is the sum of the rankings for all publications in a given year for 
a given economist, a rise in the indicator does not necessarily mean that the 
average quality has increased. Even if the average quality diminishes, it may be 
compensated by an increased number of (ranked) publications. 
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– Fed New York ranking (attributing marks: 400, 200, 
etc. down to 25. We attribute the mark nil when a 
publication is not included in this ranking). 
– RePEc ranking. 
– JCR influence and JCR ranking. 
 
 By taking into account the quality of publications, we are able to 
enlarge our control group to include not only economists who 
were awarded other prizes (Frisch Medal, IZA), but also 
economists who are highly ranked in the RePEc classification. 
We add another condition related to age (the economist must be 
at least 60 at the end of the period, since age has an impact on 
productivity, even if we control for it). 
 Since economics is divided into more different areas than 
mathematics, we are able to study the impact of awarding the 
Nobel Prize to a given economist (and thus to a given area, since 
economists are increasingly specialized) over other contenders 
specializing in the same area in the control group (does their 
productivity decrease due to the disappointment of not being 
awarded the prize?). We consider contenders of a certain age (at 
least 55 in the year of the “disappointment”): their probability of 
receiving the Nobel Prize later on in the same area of economics 
should indeed be decreased. This would be a “by-product” of the 
Nobel Prize: even if it does not have a direct impact on those 
who are rewarded, it may affect the productivity of those 
“missing” this prize. 
 
Chan et al. (2013) also test the impact of the John Bates Clark 
Medal for economists using a diff-in-diffs methodology. They build 
a synthetic control group of non recipient scholars with similar 
2014/04 
10 
  
previous research performance. Yet, their analysis does not control 
for certain variables or effects such as individual fixed effects. As we 
will see, this point is important, all the more so as samples are 
limited and individuals specific. 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
In the regressions, the general linear models (GLM) method 
is used, with the inclusion of some controls, such as age or certain 
fixed effects, depending on the case. 
 
For years in which no publications are registered, we take the 
value nil. 
 
When the explanatory variables are rankings, we sum up all 
the rankings for a given year. 
 
To take into account the time needed to publish an article, we 
consider the post-prize period as beginning three years after the prize 
was granted. 
This period of three years is necessary not just because of the 
time needed for the publication process, but also because in the 
period immediately after the award of the Nobel Prize, the prize-
winner’s rankings are boosted thanks to the publication of the Nobel 
award speech, which often appears in reviews such as the American 
Economic Review or the Scandinavian Journal of Economics. This 
boost in the cumulated rankings can be checked in the table in the 
appendix, even if this table, calculated directly for the pool of 
publications by all Nobel Prize winners, does not take into account 
either the year or the economist fixed effects and does not exhibit 
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standard errors. In spite of the boost in the total score due to the 
immediate effect of the Nobel Prize (i.e. up to 3 years after), the 
average scores seem to follow a regular decreasing path, justifying 
once more the inclusion of years and ages. 
 
The reference regression is as follows, using yearly data: 
 
Productivityi,t = a + b.dummy post John Bates Clark + c.dummy post 
Nobel + d.dummy post IZA or Frisch Medal + e.period post 
“disappointment” + f(age) + fixed effectsi + fixed effectst 
 
Where productivity i,t is the number of publications/working papers 
or the quality of the publications of the economist i, in year t. f(age) 
is a fourth degree polynomial function depending on age. 
The “post disappointment” period corresponds to the years 
following that in which the Nobel Prize was attributed to an 
economist working on the same topics as the other economists in the 
control group who were at least 55 years at that time. 
 
Formally, we should also include a variable for the period 
post prize attribution for the control group. However, with the 
exception of the John Bates Clark Medal, which is attributed to 
economists up to the age of 40, the prizes under consideration have 
no age limit. Moreover, the function of the age of the economists 
partly fulfills this requirement. The inclusion of the “post 
disappointment” period also meets this requirement, and has the 
advantage of also taking into account the economists’ area of 
specialization. 
As a robustness check, we test regressions with a 
supplementary variable covering the period after the age of 40, and 
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the results are almost unchanged (Cf. also Tables 4 to 6, where the 
effects of the John Bates Clark Medal are tested separately with the 
inclusion of a variable to control for the fact of being over 40). 
 
4.1.Regressions with the number of publications and 
rankings 
 
 
We first set regressions without fixed effects (Cf. table 1).  
 
The results are as follows: 
 The impact of the John Bates Clark Medal is significant at the 
1% level in all cases and it seems to have a positive influence on 
productivity (number of publications and quality). The results are 
similar for the variable “Frisch Medal or IZA”, which has a  
positive influence on the quality of the publications, but not on 
their number.  
 The Nobel Prize variable is never significant. 
 The “post disappointment” period boosts the number of 
publications, but not their quality. 
 
However, as shown in the next table, which displays the 
reference regressions with economist and year fixed effects, some of 
these results are affected and are not robust to the inclusion of these 
fixed effects. 
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Table 1: Regressions without fixed effects 
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The inclusion of economist and year fixed effects gives the following 
results (Cf. table 2): 
 
 The John Bates Clark Medal no longer has an influence on the 
number of publications. The influence on quality remains 
significant at the 1% or 5% level for all ranking indicators, but 
the effect becomes negative. This finding would be consistent 
with that of Borjas and Doran (2013) for the Fields Medal, 
particularly as the age threshold (40) is the same for both prizes. 
The inclusion of these fixed effects would also explain the 
difference of conclusions with Chan et al. (2013), in which a diff-
in-diffs methodology is also used to estimate the impact of the 
John Bates Clark Medal, with a robust control group. Indeed, due 
to the small size of samples for treatment groups, not controlling 
for economists fixed effects may change drastically results (all 
the more so as economist who win prizes cannot really be 
considered as homogeneous, because they have strong individual 
characteristics, including the choice of their specializations). 
 The influence of the Frisch or Iza prizes on the quality of articles 
remains significant for just two indicators, and then only at the 
10% level. 
 The Nobel Prize continues to have no significant effect on all 
indicators 
 The finding whereby the “post disappointment” period boosts the 
number of publications is still valid and still significant at the 1% 
level, although the magnitude of the effect is lessened. 
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Table 2: Regressions with economist and year fixed effects 
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Table 3: Regressions with economist fixed effects and without year fixed effects 
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In Table 3 we also perform the same regressions using 
economist fixed effects, but without year fixed effects. The results 
are on the whole consistent with the main findings of our previous 
regressions (negative influence of the John Bates Clark Medal on the 
quality of publications and positive effect on the number of 
publications “post-disappointment” but coefficients are globally less 
significant). 
 
Since the main results concern the John Bates Clark Medal, 
we also perform the regressions by including only the John Bates 
Clark, to avoid any colinearity effects. Since this prize concerns 
economists under the age of 40, we also control for the fact of being 
over 40. Our findings on the effect of the John Bates Clark Medal 
(Cf. Tables 4 to 6, where Table 5, like Table 2, is the benchmark 
result with the most fixed effects) are very similar to those in Tables 
1 to 3. 
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Table 4: Regressions with the John Bates Clark Medal alone, without fixed effects 
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Table 5: Regressions with the John Bates Clark Medal alone, with economist and year fixed effects 
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Table 6: Regressions with the John Bates Clark Medal alone, with economist fixed effects and without 
year fixed effects 
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4.2.Regressions with “other articles” (i.e. not classified by 
the Federal Reserve ranking) 
 
Table 7: Regression with the number of publications not listed by the 
Federal Reserve, with and without economist and/or year fixed 
effects 
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We then analyze the influence of prizes on publications in 
reviews not classified by the Federal Reserve, which means 
publications in reviews in non-standard areas, possibly intended to 
diversify the economist’s specialization, or in reviews with a limited 
reputation. In this latter case, this phenomenon may be the 
consequence of either 1/ a change in the objective quality of the 
economist’s publications, or the fact that he/she is paying less 
attention to the ranking of the review, or 2/ an increase in the overall 
number of articles published by the economist, and thus the 
publication of a certain number in reviews that are not as good as 
expected, as a kind of “collateral” effect of this boost in the number 
of publications. 
 
For economists awarded the John Bates Clark Medal, the first 
effect seems to hold true if we combine the results of Table 7 with 
those in Table 2. Economists receiving the John Bates Clark Medal 
do not reduce their total number of publications, but they maintain 
this level by reducing the number of publications in well-ranked 
reviews, which has an impact on the annual quality of their 
publications post-prize. This finding on diminished quality is 
particularly robust given that the prestige of this award and the 
possibilities offered by the related financing should, on the contrary, 
boost the rate of acceptance of submissions in well-ranked reviews, 
and diminish the magnitude of this altered quality. 
 
For economists who are in the “post-disappointment” period, 
the second hypothesis is the most likely, since Table 2 shows that the 
number of publications increases, but with no increase in the yearly 
cumulated quality.  
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For economists awarded the Nobel Prize or the Frisch/IZA 
prizes, there seems to be no influence on the number of publications 
in other reviews. 
 
4.3.Regressions with working papers 
 
Table 8: Regressions with the number of working papers, with and 
without economist and/or year fixed effects  
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As a complement, we analyze the impact of prizes on the 
number of published working papers (Cf. table 8), which allow 
economists to display their findings via a process which is generally 
“lighter” than the one for reviews. 
 
If we focus on regressions using both economist and year 
fixed effects, we find that the John Bates Clark has no influence 
whereas the Frisch or IZA awards boost the number of working 
papers. Interestingly, the Nobel Prize seems to have a significant 
negative impact on the number of working papers, but no obvious 
impact on the number of articles or on their quality. 
Either Nobel Prize winners choose to spend less time on this 
process, independently of the review process, or, most likely, they 
choose to save time by submitting their articles directly to reviews, 
without going through the “first step” of publishing in working 
papers. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Combining our results, we find that: 
 John Bates Clark Medals alter the (yearly cumulated) ranking of 
articles, while the number of publications remains unchanged, 
but only because of an increase in publications in non-ranked 
reviews. 
 Nobel Prizes neither alter the number of articles nor their 
quality, which does not mean that there is no “composition” 
effect, as the proportion of articles in reviews such as the 
Journal of Economic Literature increases noticeably. They 
diminish the number of working papers: Nobel winners seem to 
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adjust their time allocation, as they are still interested in 
publishing in well-ranked reviews, but spend less time than 
before on the working papers process. They thus allocate their 
time in a different way, probably giving more interviews, taking 
on more responsibilities… or simply taking more time off. 
 Results are more mixed for awards such as the Frisch Medal or 
the IZA award. 
 Prizes do not just have direct effects, they also seem to have an 
influence on the contenders, as shown by the results of the “post-
disappointment” period: the (yearly cumulated) ranking of 
articles is unchanged, but the number of publications increases, 
thanks to non-ranked reviews. This may be due to (aborted) 
attempts to publish more in ranked reviews or a desire to 
diversify their output, including in topics not covered by 
“traditional” ranked reviews.  
 
A further step would be to consider the interaction of the 
different prizes: is there a “learning effect” for economists awarded 
several prizes, i.e. a reaction different from those awarded just one 
prize? Does the way the post-reward period is managed (typically the 
post John Bates Clark period) in terms of number of publications or 
their quality, increase the probability of receiving the Nobel Prize, or 
is this awarded for one-off contributions? 
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Appendix: scores (sum of rankings and average scores) by Nobel Prize winners before, during and after 
the Nobel Prize period 
 
 
 
Source: RePEc, author’s calculations 
Scores by Nobel prize winners
Up to 3 years before the 
Nobel prize
Up to 3 years after the 
Nobel prize
between 4 and 6 years 
after the Nobel prize
Sum of RePEc rankings 175,98 243,69 127,82
Average of RePEc rankings 1,05 0,94 0,87
Sum of JCR influence 375,57 579,15 317,21
Average of JCR influence 2,25 2,24 2,16
Sum of JCR impact 667,76 970,77 501,73
Average of JCR impact 4,00 3,76 3,41
Sum of ECB rankings 105,33 158,17 79,67
Average of ECB rankings 0,63 0,61 0,53
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